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THE INTERACTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW WITH THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS. 
PRESENT PROBLEMS1
Resumen: Los sistemas de incorporación del Derecho internacional 
en las legislaciones internas, así como la ejecutabilidad de las resolucio-
nes internacionales, constituyen los elementos esenciales que regulan el 
grado de cumplimiento del Derecho internacional de los derechos hu-
manos. En este sentido, las relaciones internacionales están controlando 
el funcionamiento de estos mecanismos convirtiendo estas normas en 
una herramienta de prueba de acciones adoptadas como resultados de 
consideraciones de política exterior. Esta tendencia puede ser apreciada 
en diferentes aspectos. Por un lado, las diferencias entre sistemas monis-
tas y dualistas están desapareciendo. Por otro lado, diversas enmiendas 
constitucionales y legales han sido promulgadas con el propósito de evi-
tar el cumplimiento de otros compromisos internacionales. Además, la 
mayoría de las Constituciones no clarifican el estatus de las normas jus 
cogens de carácter consuetudinario y el criterio que debe prevalecer en 
caso de que diversas instituciones internacionales mantengan diferencias 
relativas a un derecho fundamental.
Palabras clave: Derecho internacional, derechos humanos, mecanis-
mos de inserción del Derecho internacional. 
Abstract: The incorporation of international law in domestic juris-
dictions and the enforceability of international resolutions constitute 
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the key elements that regulate the degree of fulfilment of International 
Human Rights Law. In this sense, international relations are controlling 
the operation of these mechanisms converting these norms in an eviden-
ce tool of actions adopted as a result of foreign policy considerations. 
This tendency could be seen in several aspects. On the one hand, the 
differences between monist and dualist systems are disappearing. On the 
other hand, in a number of countries legal and constitutional amend-
ments have been promulgated with the propose to avoid the observance 
of international commitments. Besides, most Constitutions do not cla-
rify the status of customary jus cogens norms and the prevailing criterion 
in case that diverse international institutions maintain differences regar-
ding one fundamental right.
Keywords: International law, human rights, international law incor-
poration systems.  
Sumario: I. Introductory. II. Considerations related to the incor-
poration of international human rights law in domestic jurisdictions: 1. 
Monists systems v. dualist systems. 2. Capacity to commit a State in the 
international sphere. Legislative power v. Executive power. 3. Problems 
connected with the self-executing character of international human 
rights norms. 4. Hierarchy position of international treaties in domestic 
jurisdictions. 5. Universal Jurisdiction. III. The development of enforce-
ment mechanisms by the international institutions specialized in human 
rights. IV. Conclusions. Bibliography. 
I.    Introductory
The events that preceded and continued the promulgation of the 
judgement of the United States Supreme Court, in the case Hadam v 
Rumsfeld, have outlined the vulnerability of the international system de-
veloped for the protection of human rights, in the present panorama of 
the international relations.
First, the circumstances that control the incorporation of Internatio-
nal Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law in domes-
tic jurisdictions are subject to political considerations that, in some ca-
ses, ignore the obligation to fulfil their precepts. In this sense, the use of 
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several terms,1 has favoured interpretations that place this subject in an 
international limbo.2 In this field is significant the fact, that the United 
States Supreme Court has considered that there are some principles of 
the Geneva Conventions from 1949, connected with the respect of the 
due process, that protect the right to be present during the hearings and 
the right of defence.3 On the contrary, the proclamation of this judg–
ment has not impaired that in several countries legal norms that restrict 
the right of habeas corpus4 has been approved.   
Second, a number of appearances before the Human Rights Com-
mittee of the United Nations and other similar bodies have revealed the 
existing distance between the promulgation of an international body of 
human rights norms and the subordination of its implementation me-
thods to considerations of foreign policy.5 The fact that only one interna-
tional institution has the power to approve coercive measures and that, 
1 As war on terror, with the propose to persuade the audience that anything goes, and that execu-
tive power is supreme over legislative or judicial power. See Vorkink, Mark W. and Scheick, Erin M. The 
“War on Terror” and the Erosion of the Rule of Law: The U.S. Hearings of the International Court of Justice 
Eminent Jurist Panel. Human Rights Brief. Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, A Legal 
Resource for the International Human Rights Community American University Washington College of 
Law, 14 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief 51 (2006). 2 at 6. 
2 See Continuing Controversy regarding Secret U.S. Rendition and Detention Practices. The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 1. ( Jan., 2006), pp. 232-236. “Secretary Rice gave a detailed 
statement…The captured terrorists of the 21st century do not fit easily into traditional systems of criminal or 
military justice, which were designed for different needs. We have to adapt. Other governments are now also 
facing this challenge”. 
3 The Congress Joint Resolution gives to the president of the United States of America the powers to 
use all  necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned 
authorized, committed or order the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda terrorist attacks.
Gabor Rona -legal adviser of the International Committee of the Red Cross- considers that in Interna-
tional Humanitarian  Law only exists two situations of conflict: international arm conflict between two 
states and non international conflict: insurrections and guerrillas that are local in the scope and objectives, 
Therefore the War on Terror is out scope of the IHL.
4 The right of habeas corpus is recognized by different international human rights instruments. For 
instance, article 9.4 of the Intentional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
5 Human Rights Committee Considers Report of the Human Rights.  United Nations Human Rights 
Committee Press Release, 18 July 2006. Second, Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act authorized federal 
prosecutors to issue subpoenas for records about an individual that were held by third parties. The Act had 
extended to investigators in international terrorism and espionage investigations an authority comparable to 
a grand jury subpoena power, with the exception that such orders required prior judicial approval. In addition, 
the Patriot Act specifically provided that recipients of a Section 215 order could consult an attorney and chal-
lenge it in court….Similarly, the Terrorist Surveillance Programme was consistent with Article 17 of the Cove-
nant. Under the Programme, the National Security Agency targeted for inception communications between 
persons in and outside the United States, where there were reasonable grounds to believe that either party was 
a member of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard 
was a “probable cause” standard of proof. That barred unreasonable searches, but did not require a court order 
or warrant in all instances. Indeed the Supreme Court had recognized that searches without a warrant were 
permissible for “special needs” and the Terrorist Surveillance Programme served such a need.
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exceptionally, the resolutions of international tribunals have enforce-
ment powers, demonstrates the vulnerability of the international system 
developed for the protection of human rights. Hence, this paper deals 
with two problems: On the one hand, the interrelation between interna-
tional human rights law and the incorporation methods implement for 
the fulfilment of its norms in domestic jurisdictions and, on the other 
hand, the enforcements mechanisms developed by the international hu-
man rights institutions.  
II.  CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE INCORPORATION OF  INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS
In consideration to the subsidiarity of international law, the interna-
tional community gives freedom to the States to select the most appro-
priate incorporation system of its norms in their domestic jurisdictions. 
Unfortunately, this consideration frequently is only interpreted from a 
discretionary approach, obviating the obligation to fulfil its norms under 
penalty of international responsibility. The methods used to reach this 
purpose are different in nature and most of them are used under a wrong 
interpretation of the principle of non-inference in domestic affairs. Con-
textually, the incorporation system of international human rights law in 
domestic jurisdictions follows separate phases connected with the legal 
techniques developed by each State.6
1. Monists systems v. dualist systems
Initially, this subject was connected with the legal tradition of each 
state, however, at present, is much influenced by sociopolitical elements. 
In general terms, for monist systems international law constitutes a uni-
ty with domestic law. Therefore, it can be used and allegated by public 
powers and citizens. On the contrary, dualist systems consider both legal 
bodies as independent. Consequently, it is necessary the enactment of an 
internal act to put into effect the international norm. The doctrine con-
siders as examples of monists system the Spanish Constitution of 1978,7 
the French Constitution of 1958,8 the Russian Constitution of 1993,9 
6 Considering the space limitation of this work, this paper will deal only with the sources of  interna-
tional  law in general terms.
7 See Article 96.1.
8 See Article 55.
9 See Article 15.4.
The interaction of international human rights law with the domestic jurisdictions.   365
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá I (2008) 361-391
the Fundamental Law of Bonn,10 the Turkish Constitution of 1982,11 
the Bolivarian Constitution of 1967,12 the Romanian Constitution of 
1991,13 the Honduran Constitution of 1982.14 In the same way, the ju-
risprudence of these countries has recognized this principle in numerous 
resolutions:15
Les lois d’assentiment du 28 février 1959 et du 8 novembre 1975 
énoncent que les actes internationaux visés «sortiront leur pleine et en-
tier effet»... La Cour devra toutefois exécuter son contrôle en tenant 
compte de ce qu’en l’espèce, il s’agit non d’un acte de souveraineté unila-
térale mais d’une norme conventionnelle produisant également des effets 
de droit en dehors de l’ordre juridique interne.
Most international institutions maintain a contradictory position on 
this subject. The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations re-
mains indifference in connection with the election of a monist or dualist 
system, because it considers that the promulgation of constitutional or 
legal dispositions is an insufficient measure16. On the contrary, the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities, considering the uniformity re-
quired for the application of the acquis communautaire and the content 
of the former article 189 of the European Economic Community treaty, 
has recognized the direct applicability of the European law in matters of 
its competence. 17 In the same way, the Interamerican Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have reaffirmed the 
direct effect of their resolutions.18 The increasing importance that have 
acquired these institutions, have favoured that the United Kingdom, a 
country with a prominent dualist tradition, has promulgated the Hu-
10 See Article 25.
11 See Article 90.
12 See Article 22.
13 See Article 11.2.
14 See Article 16.
15 Cour d’Arbitrage – Belgie Arrêt nº 12/94. 3 February 1994 (Moniteur Belge 1994, p. 6137-6146).
In the same way, see the judgment of the Supreme Court of Venezuela, December 2, 1997, in the ap-
peal registered by  Rafael Virgilio Padilla, and the sentence form the Corte Suprema de Justicia de Hon-
duras, of june 29, 1989, in the appeal made by the lawyer Oscar Armando Manzanares.
16 General Observation nº 3, adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in its 13 ses-
sions period, 1981. HRI7GEN/1/Rev. 1. 29 Jul. 1994.
17 See Flamino Costa v. Engel. Court of Justice of the European Communities, case 6/64 (15-7-1964) 
and Amministratione delle Finanze del Stato v Simmenthal. Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties, case 106 /77 (9-3-1978).
18 In relation with the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights see case Bámaca Velásquez, Resolución 
de la Corte de 29 de agosto de 1998, Corte I.D.H. (Ser. E) (1998). 
In relation with the European Court on Human Rights see Pekov v. Bulgaria (Application no. 
50358/99). 30 March 2006. 
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man Rights Act in 1998. This rule transcribes the content of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, allowing its direct allegation before 
tribunals and establishing the obligation to be observed by the public 
powers. Romania19 and Poland20 have adopted similar process.
The influence of political, economic, social, and cultural circumstan-
ces in this process could be appreciated in the change of interpretation 
suffered by article 6 section 2 of the United States Constitution. Initially, 
a literal interpretation of this precept -…all treaties made, or will shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United Status, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land and the judges in every sate shall be bound thereby; any thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any Sate to the Contrary notwithstanding 
–   establishs the existence of a monist system. This was the criterion used 
by the Supreme Court in some of its most prestigious sentences.21 On 
the contrary, at present, the jurisprudence is not homogeneous. In the 
case, Thompson v. Oklahoma,22 the Supreme Court, in connection with 
the application of the death penalty to minors, and following the criteria 
established by the chief justice, John Marshall, in 1804, confers to the 
International Human Rights Law an interpretative value.23 In the case, 
United States v. Álvarez-Machain,24 in connection with an application of 
lack of jurisdiction, concerning the kidnap of a criminal by agents of the 
Drugs Enforcement Administration in Mexico, the criterion used was 
more restrictive. It was considered that the courts from the United States 
of America have jurisdiction although the kidnap “may be… shocking… 
and.. in violation of general international law principles”. In the case Sale 
v. Haitian Centres Council,25 concerning the rights of non-refoulement, 
19 See Popescu, Corneliu-Liviu. Protectia internationationala a drepturilor Omului. Bucuresti; Edi-
turea: ALL BECK, 2000. 269 at 271.
20 See the senate proposals in relation with the ratification  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
in Kedzia, Zdzislaw. The Place of Human Rights Treaties in the Polish Legal Order. European Journal of 
International Law Vol. 2 (1991) No. 2. 113 at 141.
21 In the case The Paquete Habana -The Supreme Court of the United States, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)-  it 
was considered that customary international law is Part of our law, and must be ascertain and administered 
by courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of rights depending upon it are duly pre-
sented for their determination.
22 Thompson v Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), Supreme Court of Justice in http://www.oyez.org/
cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_6169/.
23 At least three conventions forbid the application to minors of the death penalty,  the Geneva Con-
vention on Protection of Civilians in Wartime, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a 
treaty of the United Nations, and the American Convention on Human Rights.
24 United States, petitioner v. Humberto Álvarez-Machain. Supreme Court of the United States, No. 
91-712. June 15, 1992 in http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-712.ZD.html 
25 Sale v. Haitian Centres Council, Supreme Court of the United States.  Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (21 June 
1993).
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the Supreme Court decided that asylum applicants were not returnees 
because they had never been in the territory of the United States, but 
they have been merely put back. This decision was taken against the pre-
vious criterion of the Department of Sate and the Department of Justice, 
the Court of Appeal and the opinion of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees in his intervention as Amicus Curiae.26 Finally, 
in the case Breard v. Greene,27 the Supreme Court resolved to ignore a 
request from the International Court of Justice in relation with the ad-
journment of the execution of a Paraguayan citizen.
Two circumstances have favoured this broad interpretation of the 
supremacy clause. First, this precept has been considered exclusively 
in connection with the acts of the states.28 This situation has relegated 
International Law to a secondary place in relation to the behaviour of 
federal institutions. In this order, if a conflict exists between the Consti-
tution and the International Law, the first must prevail.29 On the other 
hand, the Congress can overrule the effects of an international treaty by 
the promulgation of a subsequent act.30 These premises has favoured that 
different scholars consider that the authority of federal judges to inter-
pretate and apply customary international law, without the existence of 
26 The Inter American Commission of Human Rights, one year later, published a report where the con-
sequences of the not consideration of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees were described. 
Later many of the repatriated refugees were arrested at home. Others never made it home and were arrested at 
pre-established roadblocks. Several were found shot to death, and some were beaten in public by the military, 
which forced people at gunpoint to identify the repatriated Haitians. Others were taken to the national peni-
tentiary where they were beaten daily and not fed, and some were tortured to death in prison. Detainees were 
told by at least one prison guard that they were being tortured for having fled Haiti, and that others would 
suffer the same fate. Others were informed that a local judge had issued arrest warrants for repatriated refugees 
because they had left Haiti and criticized the military. En Cassel, Doug. Bringing Human Rights Home. 
International Law In The United States Supreme Court. First Monday Program: Northwestern University 
School of Law; October 5th, 1998. 6 p. [Date of search: March, 2007]. Available in:  http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/ihr/docs/1mon.pdf.
27 See Bread v. Greene in Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law Journal 5.69 ( June 1999). [Date of search: 
march, 2007] Available in http://www.jacksonlewis.com/attorneys/vattorney.cfm?aid=1010.
28 Justice Joseph Story noted in his 1833 exposition of the Constitution. It is notorious, that treaty stipula-
tions (especially those of the treaty of peace of 1783) were grossly disregarded by the states under the confedera-
tion. They were deemed by the states, not as laws, but like requisitions, of mere moral obligation, and depen-
dent upon the good will of the states for their execution...
29 Reid v. Covert, U.S. Supreme Court 354 U.S. 1, 1957; Geofrey v. Riggs, U. S. Supreme Court 133 258 
(1890), in Reed, J.W.R. Political Review of the European Court of Justice and its Jurisprudence. NYU 
School of Law, 1995. Jean Monnet Center. [Date of search : March, 2007] Available in: http://www.
jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9513ind.html-  and  Joyner, Daniel H. A normative model for the 
integration of customary international law into United States Law. Cited: 11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l 
L. 133. 
30 Bread v. Greene. Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law Journal 5.69 ( June 1999). 
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a previous legislative transposition, could be considered pretentious for 
the American legal system.31 
In application of doctrine of separation of powers, that limits inter-
nal interferences,32 the president acts as the sole body of foreign poli-
cy -Act of State Doctrine-.33 In this order, he can cancel an international 
compromise adopted by his country. An example of this situation is pro-
vided by the withdrawal from the Mutual Defence Treaty between the 
United States and Taiwan, although the Supreme Court has not reached 
a final decision on the merits. On the contrary, the German Constitutio-
nal Federal Court has developed a different criterion in the case J.Abr. 
Frowein: Solange II.34
Probably the most important change of approach took place when 
the Senate, in June 1981, dealt with the rather unimportant and now 
dismantled European organisation called “Eurocontrol”. In this decision 
the Court pronounced that it is the Federal Constitutional Court’s task 
to make sure that violations of public international law which could in-
cur the international responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany 
should be avoided or redressed.
These arguments underline the existence of several legal contradic-
tions. For instance, the legal system of the United Sates of America is ba-
sed in the principle of limit powers. This notion forbids to rule outside its 
constitutional competences. In this context, federal powers could assume 
international obligations that affect issues considered as competences of 
the states. An example could be the right to live and the restrictions to 
the application of the death penalty.  
The French case is also contradictory in two fields. As it has been 
already mentioned, its Constitution apparently establishes a monist sys-
31 See Daniel H. Joyner. A normative model for the integration of customary international law into 
United States Law. Cited: 11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 133.
32 It is necessary a majority of two thirds of the senate members for the ratification of an international 
treaty.
33 Delson, Robert, The act of state doctrine judicial deference or abstention?. The American Journal of In-
ternational Law, Vol. 66, No. 1. ( Jan., 1972), 82 at 93. Available in: http://www.jstor.org/view/00029300/
di981763/98p0497p/0 . The following discussion of the historical development of the act of state doctrine in 
the United States suggests that the purpose of the doctrine is not to secure judicial deference to the Executive 
Branch, i.e., to compel the courts to follow all Executive suggestions with reference to the propriety of examin-
ing the validity of foreign sovereign acts, but rather to assure that U.S. foreign relations remain the exclusive 
responsibility of the Executive Branch, and that the Executive may not shift such responsibility to the courts. 
Hence, the courts should abstain from passing upon the validity of foreign sovereign acts notwithstanding State 
Department suggestions to the contrary. The only exception to this rule, the “Bernstein exception,” is more ap-
parent than real, as will appear below.
34 J. Abr. Frowein: Solange II. Constitutional Federal Court of Germany (25 C.M.L. Rev 201 (1988). 
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tem.35 On the contrary, its judiciary,36 traditionally, has been divergent to 
make interpretations regarding international law. The minister of foreign 
affairs through the prejudicial question has assumed this task. However, 
this situation is changing as a result the case Nicolo.37
It should be added that the principle itself of reference to the Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, which has the double disadvantage of entrusting 
the interpretation of an international agreement to one of its signatories 
and of putting the State in the position of both judge and party in a good 
many causes, is now the subject of considerable dispute and the possibili-
ty cannot be ruled out that one day soon it will be abandoned.
In the same way, the French constitutional reference concerning the 
reciprocity is in direct contradiction with several international human 
rights treaties. Mainly, because these instruments consider human beens 
and not States their beneficiaries.38
Commonwealth countries could be considered as an example of 
dualists systems. Contrary to the tradition followed by other nations, 
their Constitutions remain silence in connection with the incorporation 
system of International Law in their domestic jurisdictions. For this rea-
son, the judiciary has assumed this task.39 The Australian sentence in the 
case Kowarta v. Bjelke Peterson40  is representative of this principle.
35 In the same way see the reference made to the reciprocity, with regard to the enforcement of human 
rights treaties whose addressees are the citizens and not the States.
36 In relation with the possible conflicts of interpretation that could arise, between the Cour de Cas-
sation and the Constitutional Council, with regard to human rights, the practice has demonstrated the 
inexistence of contradictions.
37 Nicolo Case, Opinion of the Commissaire du gouvernement (Raoul Georges). Conseil d’Etat. 20 
October 1990. 1989 [1990] 1 CMLR 173.
38 In the sphere of the EU reciprocity is not applicable . See Cafés Jacques: Administration des Douanes 
v. Société “Cafés Jacques Vabre” cie Cour de Cassation [1975] 2 CMLR 336. 
39 The Common Law has used the criteria of the case R. v. Keyn (Franconia) 1876 LR 2 Ex D 63. UK. 
See Alexandrowicz, Charles Henry.  International Law in the Municipal Sphere according to Australian 
Decisions. Oxford University Press. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1. 
( Jan., 1964), 78 at 95. English and Commonwealth lawyers have considered the relevant problems against 
the background of the Blackstonian doctrine according to which the law of nations is part of the law of the land, 
but no consensus of opinion has prevailed as to the ultimate validity of the doctrine since some writers have 
proposed to treat international law as a source of municipal law instead of having it “incorporated” in the lat-
ter… Franconia case (1876) the court stated that the territory of England ends at the low water mark and that 
jurisdiction could not be assumed over foreign nationals in territorial waters. The court in this case abandoned 
(presumably) 23 the Blackstonian doctrine and made the transformation of international customary law into 
municipal law by legislation essential for the application of the former within the sphere of the latter.
  See Re Admision to Practice of Fitgerald (1997) Supreme Court o Belize. 2 Carib LB 99 quoted in 
Rose-Marie Belle Antoine. Commonwealth Carribean Law and Legal System. Commonwealth Caribbean 
Series. London:  Cavebdish Publishing Limited, 2000 p. 154.
40 Koowarta v Bjelke Peterson. 153 C.L.R 168, 1981. Supreme Court of Australia.
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It is a well-settled principle of the Common Law that a treaty not 
terminating a state of war has no legal effect upon the rights and du-
ties of Australian citizens and is not incorporated into Australian law 
on its ratification by Australia.  As Barwick CJ and Gibbs J observed in 
Bradley v. The Commonwealth [4] , the approval by the Commonwealth 
Parliament of the Charter of the United Nations in the Charter of the 
United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) did not incorporate the provisions of the 
Charter into Australian law.  To achieve this result the provisions have 
to be enacted as part of our domestic law, whether by Commonwealth 
or State statute.
From it origins, the application of International Human Rights Law, 
has raised several problems in commonwealth countries. On the one 
hand, the Common Law, for centuries has represented a supranational 
body of norms that could be applied in different nations.41 The possibili-
ty to enforce directly international norms threatened the creative powers 
of British judges. Under this premise, the first period of the application 
of International Human Rights Law in these Sates, was marked by the 
frozen law doctrine.42 The point of change of this situation was repre-
sented by the influence of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council -especially 
by the use of the necessary argumentations to restrict the application of 
the death penalty-.43 Paradoxically, this situation has favoured the quest 
of new judicial mechanisms that pursued the inapplicability of interna-
tional human rights norms. The strategies used to achieve this goal were, 
the withdrawal from international instruments in this field,44 the pro-
41 This duality of supranational legal systems, that could have contradictions between their norms, was 
the cause to relegate International Human Rights Law to a secondary position. The doctrine considered 
that this international body of norms came from the Common Law.
42 See Barnett, Lloyd. Human Rights and the Machinery of Justice Caribbean Judicial Approach to the 
Constitutional and Conventional Human Rights Provisions. in Seminar for Caribbean Judicial Officers on 
International Human Rights Norms and the Judicial Function. San José: IIHR – University of the West 
Indies, 1995. p. 45: to a great extent constitutional guarantees of human rights in the Caribbean had been in 
danger of atrophy by reason of judicial predilection for “the frozen law doctrines” enunciated in the celebrated 
Nasralla Case, in which Lord Devlin stated that the Bill of Rights  provisions of the Jamaican Constitution 
proceed  upon the presumption that the  fundamental rights  which it covers are already ( at independence) 
“secured to the people of Jamaica by existing law…»
43 In relation with the inhuman treatment that supposes the unjustified delay in the dead row see Mejia 
v. Guevara. Sentence of the Belize Supreme Court, 11 June  2001. in Conteh, Abdulai O. Implementation 
of International Human Rights Obligations and Respect for International Standards in the Inter-American 
System of the Segment: Implementation Through Judicial, Quasi-judicial and other Supervisory Mechanisms 
C.J. in Belize Law Review, Attorney Gerneral’s Ministry. January - June 2003, p. 6.
44 In 1998 Jamaica denounced the protocol of the ICCPR with regard to the decisions of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee. The same year, Trinidad Tobago withdrawn  from the Inter Ameri-
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mulgation of constitutional amendments that assure the effective appli-
cation of the capital punishment,45 and the replacement of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council by the Caribbean Court of Justice, as 
the last judicial remedy.
With the intention to clarify these concepts and considering the 
cultural identity of each country, 46 judges from commonwealth nations 
adopted the Bangalore Principles. This document recognizes the prima-
cy of domestic law in the judicial activity but, at the same time, ensures 
the right of direct allegation, of the international human rights law, befo-
re national courts and the obligation of States to fulfil their international 
compromises.
However, where national law is clear and inconsistent with the inter-
national obligations of the State concerned in common law countries the 
national court is obliged to give effect to national law. In such cases the 
court should draw such inconsistency to the attention of the appropria-
te authorities since the supremacy of national law in no way mitigates 
a breach of an international legal obligation, which is undertaken by a 
country.47
can Convention on Human Rights, presumably as a consequence of the impact of the resolutions of the 
Inter American Court of Human Rights in relation with the death penalty.
45 See Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms ce-
lebrated in Bangalore from 27 to 30 of December of 1998 quoted in Conteh, Abdulai O.. Implementation 
of International Human Rights Obligations and Respect for International Standards in the Inter-American 
System of the Segment: Implementation Through Judicial, Quasi-judicial and other Supervisory Mechanisms 
C.J. in Belize Law Review, Attorney Gerneral’s Ministry. January - June 2003, p. 10. It is matter of public 
concern that some legislature pass amendments to their constitutions or laws designated to erode or diminish 
fundamental rights and freedoms as interpreted and applied by national courts and by international human 
rights fora. This practice should not be resorted to and no amendment should be made which would destroy or 
impair the essential features of democratic societies governed by the rule of law.
See the Fifth Amendment to the Belizean Constitution published in the “Gazette” on December, 7th 
2002.   2. The following shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section or anything 
in this Constitution or any other Law: The imposition of a mandatory sentence of death or the execution of 
such a sentence.
Any delay in executing a sentence of death  imposed upon a person in respect of a criminal offence  under the 
Laws of Belize of which has the person been convicted;
The holding of any person in prison or the lawful place detention pending execution of a sentence of death 
impose upon that person as provided in coming into the force the Belize Constitution ( Fith Amendment) Act 
2002. Were prescribed by or under the Prisons Act them in force. Were otherwise practice in Belize in relation 
persons so in prison or detained.
46 See Conclusions of Judicial Colloquia and other meetings on the Domestic Application of Inter-
national Human Rights Norms and on Government under the Law 1988-1992. Concluding statement 
of the Judicial Colloquium held in Bangalore, India from 24-26 February 1988: Bangalore Principles. 
Chairman’s concluding statement. Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: While it is desirable for the 
norms contained in the international human rights instruments to be still more widely recognised and applied 
by national courts, this process must take fully into account local laws, traditions, circumstances and needs.
47 Ibid.
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The British parliament recognizes an especial case in sections 2.1 
and 2 of the European Communities Act. In this sense, it is reaffirmed 
the direct application and superior hierarchy of these norms without 
any further domestic enactment. However, the jurisprudence in the case 
Macarthy’s v. Smith48 specified that the parliament have the power, in a 
subsequent act, to clarify that domestic law prevails over the European 
Communities’ Law.
2.  Capacity to commit a State in the international sphere. Legislative power v. 
Executive power
One of the principal causes of confusion about the incorporation 
process of international norms in domestic jurisdictions lies in the 
functions developed by the executive and legislative powers. Traditiona-
lly, the parliaments have been the guardians of sovereignty with exclusive 
powers to create rights and obligations for its citizens. The fact that In-
ternational Human Rights Law has a direct effect in individuals, despite 
their nationality, creates two possible sceneries:
i. Systems where the power to commit or release a state from its inter-
national obligations lies, exclusively, in the executive power. As a principle, 
it is considered that foreign policy in an exclusive competence of the 
executive bodies.49 Legislative activity is only necessary when internatio-
nal instruments affect certain competences - The Spanish constitution of 
1978 established a broad enumeration of these subjects: a) Treaties of a 
political nature, b) Treaties or agreements of a military nature, c) Treaties or 
agreements affecting the territorial integrity of the State or the fundamental 
rights and duties established under Part 1, d) Treaties or agreements which 
imply financial liabilities for the Public Treasury, e) Treaties or agreements 
which involve amendment or repeal of some law or require legislative mea-
sures for their execution-. On the contrary, some legal traditions still re-
cognize privileges in favour of the executive power; this is the case of the 
Ancient Royal Prerogative in the United Kingdom. This doctrine consi-
ders international relations -including the power to celebrate treaties- as 
an authority of the crown that delegates in their ministries without an 
approval from the parliament.50 Considering that, at present, the legal 
systems tend to bring together concepts and process, in this case, the Pu-
48 McCarthy Limited v. Wendy Smith, English Court of Appeal Case 129/79 [1980] ECJ 1289. 
49 Article 7.2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
50 The supremacy of the parliament explains the existence of a dualist system. 
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blic Administration Select Committee of the Common House, 51 considered 
that the local legislative transposition was only necessary when there is a 
contradiction between a treaty and a rule in force.     
As the prerogative is a residual power it cannot be used to amend 
the general law.  This is of particular interest in relation to international 
treaties.  Although the Executive can commit the United Kingdom to 
obligations under international law, if a change to domestic law is requi-
red, it will only take effect if Parliament passes the necessary legislation.
In same new democratic societies, the profusion of constitutional 
and legal amendments has discredited the role of the parliamentary 
chambers. This situation have been used by the executive powers to make 
reforms that make up and disturb the checks and balances, assuming com-
petences of other powers. The promulgation of the United Nations Act, 
in Belize, is representative of this situation because it concentrates in the 
executive the power to ratify international agreements by a statutory act 
approved by the minister of foreign affairs. At the same time, in this case, 
the international treaty remains above any other internal norm.52
The delegation of the legislative in the executive with the propose to 
ratify international instruments,53 is other mechanism that could be sub-
sumable in this paragraph. Finally, in connection with the withdrawal 
from international instruments it could be mention again the case of the 
United States of America.
ii. Systems where the power to commit in the international sphere a 
State, require a legislative intervention through majorities less qualifies that 
others necessary for the domestic development of fundamental rights. In ju-
ridical terms, this situation represents a legal fraud. Unfortunately, it is 
used frequently under wrong interpretations of constitutional concepts. 
For example, in Romania is established that some international treaties 
51 Press Notice No.19 Session 2002-03. PASC publishes Government Defense of its sweeping preroga-
tive powers.    
52 Published  in the Gacette on March 2th, 2002. United Nations Act.  No. 1 de 2002. “Where Belize 
ratifies a United Nation Convention, such Convention shall be submitted to the National Assembly within 
thirty days of its ratification and the National Assembly may pass a law to give effect to it or, where appropri-
ate, the minister may immediately by Order Publisher in the Gazette as a statutory instrument, make such 
provisions as appear to him necessary or expedient for giving effect to such Convention within Belize and every 
such Order shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other rule, regulation 
or instrument”.
53 Popescu, Corneliu-Liviu. Protectia internationationala a drepturilor Omului (Bucuresti: ALL BECK, 
2000) p. 258. “Constitutionalitatea delegarii legislative si a interventiei ordonantei in domeniul ratificarii 
tratatelor internationale in general a fost statuata in jurisprudente Curtii Constitutionale si este o constanta 
in practica normativa a Parlamentului si a Guvernului”.
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must be adopted by an organic act. The true is that none treaty has been 
ratified through this process.54 Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution of 
1978 shows a similar situation.55 
3.  Problems connected with the self-executing character of international hu-
man rights norms
Both in the dualist system and in the monist system subsist a confu-
sion regarding the self-executing character of the International Human 
Rights norms. For some scholars as René Provost,56 most international 
norms in this area are self-executing, while for other authors, as Lord 
Dening,57 they are not. The doctrine compel that these norms should 
establish rights in a clear and precise manner, besides they should have 
the necessary elements required by the judge to be applied in a particular 
case, without the support of a legislative or statutory norm.58 The fact 
that human rights treaties recognise subjective rights to persons favours 
its self-executing character. This statement fits with the concept of civil 
and political rights,59 on the contrary, in relation with social, economical 
and cultural rights arise some doubts. In this sense, the regional systems 
established for the protection of human rights have developed weak me-
chanisms to enforce its resolutions.60 This programmatic character has 
favoured that some authors consider them as non-enforceable because 
they are merely obligations of best intents. This argument initially could 
have had a legal base, however, at present, it has lost applicability in view 
54 Ibid. p 257. “Aftel, cu carácter general , tratatale internationale se retifica prin lege ordinara, cu exceptia 
tratatelor  internationale cara au obiect relatii sociale pe care Constitutia Romaniei le rezerva legii organice, 
acestea trebuind sa fie retificate prin lege organica…In pratica de pana acum. Insa, in mod neconstitional, 
tratatele internationale in materia dreturilor omului, indiferente de continutul lor, au fost ratificate prin lege 
ordinara, iar un prin lege organica”.
55 Article 81. However, in relation with the ratification of international treaties, two types of majorities 
are required, an organic law for the instruments adopted in the scope of article 93 and an ordinary act for 
the other treaties adopted according to article 94.
56 Provost, René. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (UK: Cambrige University 
Press, 2002) p. 23
57 Quoted by Jorg Polakiewicz. The applications of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
Domestic Law in Alston, Philip and Steiner, Henry J. International Human Rights in Context. Law, Poli-
tics, Morals ( United States: Oxford University Press, 2ª ed. 2000) p. 1002: The convention is drafted in 
a style very different from the way which we are used to in legislation. It contains wide general statements of 
principle. They are apt to lead to much difficulty in application because they give rise to much uncertainty…
58 Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Guía sobre la aplicación del Derecho Internacional 
en la Jurisdicción Interna. San José, 1996  204 p. 50.
59 Mainly, because it is considered that these norms are obligations of result. 
60 This difference could be appreciated in two instruments of the European Council: The European 
Human Rights Convention and the European Social Charter. 
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of the consolidation of a juridical body of secondary law developed by 
some international institutions. Paradoxically, it has been in the fra-
mework of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, where, 
for the first time, it was recognised the self-executing character of these 
norms. Specially, in the case The Social and Economic Rights Action Cen-
tre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (SERAC),61 
was recognised the responsibility of the Nigerian Government because a 
factory violated the rights to a healthy environment.
One of the principal problems of the self-executing character of the 
international norms lies in the broad discretionary of domestic courts 
when the have to decide about the content of these norms. The Supreme 
Court of the State of California, in the case Sei Fuji v. The state of Califor-
nia established the necessity to respect some elements. First, it combines 
the use of a theological and literal criterion without specify wich one 
should prevail in case of conflict.62 Second, it makes a dangerous ligature 
between international law and reciprocity.63 Considering these aspects, 
it could be affirmed that the self-executing character of international hu-
man rights norms has an important similarity with the causes that pro-
moted the creation of the dualist systems. Consequently, this concept 
symbolizes the method used by some monist legal systems in accordance 
with the reasons that motivated the creation of the dualist systems. 
4.  Hierarchy position of international treaties in domestic jurisdictions
Although this issue has been dealt in other paragraphs, the impor-
tance that has acquired recently makes convenient to dedicate a separate 
study. In this order, the comparative law has established the existence of 
five typologies: 
61 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and The Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria, (2001), Communication No. 155/96, (African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights), online: University of Minnesota Human Rights Library.
62 SEI FUJII, Appellant, v. The State of California, Respondent, L. A. No. 21149, Supreme Court of 
California, 38 Cal. 2d 718; 242 P.2d 617; 1952 Cal. LEXIS 221, April 17, 1952. “In determining whether 
a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the 
instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances surrounding its ex-
ecution. In order for a treaty provision to be operative without the aid of implementing legislation and to have 
the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, 
standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts…”. 
63Ibid. “Treaty provisions are enforced without implementing legislation where they prescribe in detail the 
rules governing rights and obligations of individuals or specifically provide that citizens of one nation shall 
have the same rights while in the other country as are enjoyed by that country’s own citizens”.
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i. The first group is composed by the countries that considered that Inter-
national Law is above their own Constitution. One of the few examples 
that it could be mentioned in this category is article 91.3 of the Dutch 
Constitution,64 whenever a literal interpretation is made. In any case, 
the intervention of the parliamentary chamber is ensured, therefore this 
process respect the national sovereignty.
Sometimes the supraconstitutional value is recognized in view of the 
principle of more favourable norm.65 This has been the interpretation of 
the Supreme Court of Costa Rica66 in different resolutions.67 
“...El artículo 48 Constitucional tiene norma especial para lo que se 
refiere a derechos humanos, otorgándoles una fuerza normativa del pro-
pio nivel constitucional... Los instrumentos de derechos humanos vigen-
tes en Costa Rica, tienen no solamente un valor similar a la Constitución 
Política, sino que en la medida en que otorguen mayores derechos o ga-
rantías a las personas, privan por sobre la Constitución”.
Some authors consider that this doctrine is based in the progressi-
vity of  International Human Rights Law. However, it is important to 
remember that not all legal systems recognize this principle in their do-
mestic jurisdiction.68
In some cases, the supraconstitutional value has been recognized in 
regional frameworks. For example, The Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany, in the case J. Abr. Frowein: Solange II, stated the interpretative 
supremacy of the European Human Rights Court of Justice, in issues of its 
competence.
ii. The second group is composed by the countries that put on the same 
level international norms and their Constitution. This situation is only 
possible from a formal point of view, because in case of conflict always 
one of the two national legal orders must prevail. As an example it could 
be mentioned article 23 of the Venezuelan Constitution, as long as the 
International Law has not established a more favourable norm. 
iii. The third group is composed by the countries that concede to Inter-
national Law a supralegal value. In numerous situations, this group is 
recognised by a norm that establishes that in case that a treaty entry in 
64 Any provisions of a treaty that conflict with the Constitution or which lead to conflicts with it may 
be approved by the Chambers of the Parliament only if at least two-thirds of the votes cast are in favor.
65 See Ayala Corao, Carlos M. Las Consecuencias de la Jerarquía Constitucional de los Tratados relativos 
a Derechos Humanos. Ex Presidente de la Comisión Interamericana de Derecho. 1 at 39. 
66 Ibid. p.7. Corte Suprema de Costa Rica, sentence No.2313-95.
67 Judgment No.3435-92 and its explanation No.5759-93. 
68 Ibid. p. 16. 
The interaction of international human rights law with the domestic jurisdictions.   377
Anuario Facultad de Derecho – Universidad de Alcalá I (2008) 361-391
contradiction with an international norm, it will be necessary to pre-
viously modify the Constitution to make it enforceable -the paradox is 
that it set up a monist mechanism for the legislative norms and a dualist 
system for the Constitution-. 
For instance, it could be mention article 95 of the Spanish Consti-
tution.69 In this order, the Constitutional Court of Spain states that  con 
independencia de la clase de tratado internacional que sea, incluso aque-
llos que impliquen una cesión de potestades constitucionales, el principio de 
jerarquía constitucional rige y requiere la previa modificación constitucio-
nal.70 The Constitutional Federal Court from Germany, in connection 
with the adhesion to the Maastricht Treaty, used a similar criterion.71 
In this context, a special situation refers to the relation between the 
Constitution and the consuetudinary jus cogens norms. The inexistence 
of a direct act of consent places this kind of norms under the Constitu-
tion level. Considering this, in case of conflict, the judiciary should have 
to ignore its content and give preference to the Constitution. However, 
the object protected by this kind of norms, as well as is general acceptan-
ce, promote the development of interpretations that places these norms 
in a separate position of the national hierarchy of international norms.  
In other cases, same problems arise in relation with the differentia-
tion between international treaties in general, and international human 
rights treaties.72 In this order, there are few Constitutions that confer a 
69 La celebración de un tratado internacional que contenga estipulaciones contrarias a la Constitución 
exigirá la previa revisión constitucional. El Gobierno o cualquiera de las Cámaras puede requerir al Tribunal 
Constitucional para que declare si existe o no esa contradicción.
70 Declaration of July 1, 1992, (Declaration 132 bis/1992).
71 Decision of the German Constitutional Court on Mastricht. Constitutional Court 12 October 
1994 193 33 I.L.M. 388 (1994).  “The functions of the European Union and the powers granted for its 
realization are standardised by the Treaty in a manner sufficiently foreseeable to ensure that the principle of 
limited individual powers is observed, that no exclusive competence for jurisdictional conflicts is established for 
the European Union, and that the assertion of other functions and powers by the European Union and the 
European Communities is dependent upon amendments and supplements to the Treaty and therefore to the 
consent of the national parliaments (II.2.)”.
72 In connection with the nature of international human rights treaties the Inter American Court of 
Justice has established, “La Corte debe enfatizar, sin embargo, que los tratados modernos sobre derechos hu-
manos, en general, y, en particular, la Convención Americana, no son tratados multilaterales de tipo tradi-
cional, concluidos en función de un intercambio recíproco de derechos, para el beneficio mutuo de los Estados 
contratantes. Su objeto y fin son la protección de los derechos fundamentales de los seres humanos, indepen-
dientemente de su nacionalidad, tanto frente a su propio Estado como frente a los otros Estados contratantes. 
Al aprobar estos tratados sobre derechos humanos, los Estados se someten a un orden legal dentro del cual ellos, 
por el bien común, asumen varias obligaciones, no en relación con otros Estados, sino hacia los individuos bajo 
su jurisdicción”, en El Efecto de las Reservas sobre la Entrada en Vigencia de la Convención Americana 
sobre Derechos Humanos. Corte IDH. Opinión Consultiva OC-2/82 del 24 de septiembre de 1982. 
Serie A No. 2.
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superior value to human rights treaties.73 The reason for this differentia-
tion lies in the relation between Constitutional Law and International 
Human Rights Law. In some cases, several Constitutions turn to an in-
terpretative preference74 of the constitutional norms related to human 
rights.75 These cases could be considered as a previous phase for the re-
cognition of the superiority of this international body of norms.76 Fi-
nally, the Belgian Cour de Cassation recognises that the principle that a 
subsequent act overrule a previous act, can not be applied in the case of 
international treaties.77  The reason is that the rule stablished by a treaty 
shall prevail… the primacy of the treaty results from the very nature of In-
ternational treaty law.
iv. The four group is composed by the countries that situated on the same 
level International Law  and domestic Laws. This category, again, is more 
formal than real since in case of conflict one of both legal systems must 
prevail.
v. The fifth group is composed by the countries that give an inferior va-
lue to International Law with regard to their domestic laws. This system 
is mainly used by the Anglo-American countries, where the parliament 
is deep rooted in the principle of national sovereignty. In general terms, 
the main concept is that a subsequent act could overrule an international 
treaty, although the State could incur in international responsibility.
In the same way, several authors78 add in this group a general law 
provision attached to several treaties79. It refers when the domestic law 
contains interpretations, or more favourable norms, for the human been. 
In this case, the national legislation should prevail over the international 
norms. In proper terms, the international norm establishes this possibili-
ty; therefore, the existence of this hypothesis does not look like feasible 
from a material point of view.
73 Article 75 of the Argentinan Constitution.
74 This method has been used frequently in actions connected with the constitutional control of laws.
75 Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution.
76 In relation with the European Union Law See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmen-
thal, Court of Justice of the European Communities. case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629.
77 Minister for Economic Affairs v. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse ‘Le Ski’. Belgian Cour de Cassation, First 
Chamber [1972] CMLR 330.
78 Popescu, Corneliu-Liviu.  Protectia internationationala a drepturilor Omului (Bucuresti; ALL 
BECK, 2000) p 14. Prin urmare, din corelarea principiilor superioritatii normelor internationale in ma-
teria drepturilor omului si subsidiaritatii lor in  raport cu dreptul  intern, rezulta solutia conform careia, in 
caz de conflict intre o norma internationala privind drepturile omului  si o norma juridica interna, se aplica 
intotdeanua , atat la nivel internacional, cat si la nivel intern, norma mai favorbila, indifirent ca acestea este 
cea internationala sau cea interna.
79 This principle is incorporated in the Inter-american Convention, Article 29.b.
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5.  Universal Jurisdiction
The main peculiarity of the universal jurisdiction lies in the nature of 
the crime developed beyond the traditional concepts of territoriality -ra-
tioni loci-, nationality80 and protection of the State interest. In this sense, 
from a material point of view, universal jurisdiction has been developed 
in two fields: the persecution by international courts and its application 
by domestic jurisdictions.81 This situation is the result, in words of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, of the sad reality 
is that states often fail to investigate and prosecute serious human rights 
abuses.
Therefore, its object has progressed from the harassment of war cri-
mes, piracy and slave trade to the present regulation.  From the Second 
World War, several initiatives has been developed with the propose to 
condemn this kind of behaviour.82 Unfortunately, most of them require 
more uniformity. At present, the classification established in section five 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Court could be used as refe-
rence -The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
the crime of aggression-. The common element of these four typologies 
consists in its systematic application. In this sense, the development in 
domestic legislations of the universal jurisdiction, will also favour the 
repression of these behaviours when they are not committed in a genera-
lize manner, under the traditional criteria of competence.
The relation between the international and internal spheres of the 
universal jurisdiction is regulated by the subsidiarity of the second with 
regard to the first.83 The justification of this method lies in the global 
strategy of the United Nations to strengthen local capacities. Under this 
consideration, several initiatives that implement this competence has 
80 Of the victim or of the presumed criminal. 
81 Eichmann v. Attorney-General of Israel. Supreme Court of Israel (1962) 136 I.L.R. 277; Demjanjuk 
v. Petrovky, 776 F.2d 571, at 582, reprinted in 79 ILR 538, at 545; Fédération Nationale des Déportes et 
Internés Résistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 78 International Law Report 125 (Cour de Cassation, 
France, 1985);  and R. v. Finta, (24 March 1994) Canada, 1 SCR 701, Dissenting opinion by Justice LaFor-
est, in State consent regime v. Universal jurisdiction, ICRC. 10-12-1997.   
82 With doctrinal differences, the Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. The International Criminal 
Court for the former Yugoslavia, 1993, and The International Criminal Court for Ruanda, 1994.
83 See Collantes, José Luis. La Corte Penal Internacional. El impacto del Estatuto de Roma en la juris-
dicción sobre crímenes internacionales. Revista electrónica de ciencia Penal y criminología. Universidad de 
Granada. Artículos  RECPC 04-07 (2002). 23 p. “A diferencia de los Estatutos del TIPY y del TIPR,  que 
establecen jurisdicciones simultaneas con los tribunales nacionales, el Preámbulo y el art.1 del estatuto de la 
CPI prevén una jurisdicción con carácter complementario a la justicia penal de los Estados”. 
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been developed  -as the creation of mix tribunals84 or the approval of 
international agreements that compel states to adopt domestic laws-85 
, with varied results. For these reasons, the challenges confront by this 
process are diverse:
i. The absent of a connection criteria favours that contradictory judi-
cial resolutions, concerning one case, could be reached in diverse coun-
tries.86 In this sense, it should be bear in mind the impossibility to start 
before two international institutions a legal action, as well as the roman 
aphorisms non bis in idem and res judicata. 
ii. From the point of view of a judicial technique, the main problem 
arises in relation with the principles of legality and legal description that 
rule in criminal international law. In this sense, several states still have 
not developed a body of norms in connection with the universal juris-
diction. The fact that the judiciary has been in charge of the recognition 
of this concept produce several problems. In the case, Hissène Habré,87 
the Court of Appellation from Dakar considered that -although its coun-
try has developed a Constitutional monist system,88 it is members of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ments89 and the first report delivered to the committee90 recognizes the 
existence of this kind of competence in Senegal91- it had not jurisdiction 
84 It could be mention the efforts made by the United Nations to prosecute the former leaders of the 
Khmer Rouge, in Cambodia, and the configuration of a mix tribunal in East Timor. From this perspective 
the Sierra Leona Tribunal could be considered as the most successful experience. 
85 See Amnesty International. Universal Jurisdiction in http://web.amnesty.org/pages/uj-index-eng 
Amnesty International found that over 125 states had laws providing for universal jurisdiction over certain 
conduct amounting to at least one of the crimes ( for the full study see Universal Jurisdiction: The duty of 
states to enact and enforce legislation). However, no state has universal jurisdiction for all the crimes and 
many of the existing laws are flawed. 
In the United Kingdom , Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, in Spain, article 23.4 of the 
Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, in the United States of America, Section 2340A Title 18 of the United 
States Code. For more information see http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior530132001?Ope
nDocument. 
86 The former dictator from Chad, Hissène Habrésu, has been prosecuted by the Senegal Courts as 
well as by the Belgian Courts.  See Salàs Darrocha, Josep Tomàs. Corte Penal Internacional y Audiencia 
Nacional: Delimitaciones Competenciales. España: Thomson-Aranzadi.  See also article 108 of the Statute 
of Rome (ICC).
87 Republique Du Senegal, Cour d’Appel de Dakar, Chambre d’Accusation, Arrêt n’ 135 du 04-07-
2000.
88 Article 79 of the Constitution of Senegal provides: ‘’The treaties or agreements regularly ratified or 
approved have, on their publication, an authority superior to that of the laws, subject, for each treaty or agree-
ment, to its application by the other party.’’
89 Its article 5.3 opens the door to the application of the Universal Jurisdiction.
90 Established by this convention.
91 Senegal Government. Initial report of Senegal to the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/
C/5/Add.19, 15 January 1990. p. 93. [Date of search: March, 2007]. Available in: http://www.hrw.org/
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to decide in connection to a crime of torture committed abroad, by one 
of its nationals, against a foreign population. This sentence was based on 
the high level of legal security required by International law. In the same 
way, the Strasburg Court, in the Bankovic case assumed a territorial con-
cept in relation to its jurisdiction, keeping away from the jurisprudence 
previously established in the case Cyprusy Loizidou.92
iii. Several countries have developed a different judicial classification 
in connection with the universal jurisdiction or they do not include all 
the typologies gather in the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
of Justice.93 This is the case of the United Kingdom and the United Sta-
tes of America in relation with the torture. 94
iv. The influence of political aspects could be appreciated in different 
fields95. First, some domestic legislations required the previous interven-
tion of political bodies to apply the universal jurisdiction.96 A special 
case is represented when the public prosecution depends from the go-
vernment and, at the same time, the judges lack the capacity to initiate 
legal actions. The inexistence of popular action97 and other similar figures 
backgrounder/africa/chad1205/2.htm Le juge répressif sénégalais est en principe incompétent pour connâi-
tre des infractions commises à l’étranger par un étranger qui vient se réfugier chez nous. D’autant que n’étant 
pas un national sénégalais, le délinquant peut toujours être livré à l’autorité étrangère qui demanderait son 
extradition. Cette incompétence du juge sénégalais souffre cependant de deux exceptions. D’une part, quand la 
sûreté de l’Etat ou son crédit sont en jeu, le juge sénégalais va intervenir sans considérations de la nationalité 
du coupable, du lieu où son infraction a été commise. D’autre par, lorsque l’infraction commise à l’étranger par 
un étranger lèse les intérêts de la communauté internationale. Ici se pose le principe de la compétence univer-
selle prévue dans quelques conventions internationales auxquelles le Sénégal est partie, conventions relatives 
notamment au trafic des stupéfiants, au faux-monnayage et en dernier lieu la convention contre la torture.
92 The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have exer-
cised jurisdiction concerning acts committed by states members outside their territory or committed in 
their territory but have produced effects outside of them.
93 The Pinochet case deals a similar matter in connection with the kidnapping. 
94 Continuing Controversy regarding Secret U.S. Rendition and Detention Practices. The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 1. ( Jan., 2006),  232 at 236. “Vice President Richard Cheney 
and his staff have been active in opposing the legislation and have worked to exempt the Central Intelligence 
Agency from its coverage, voicing particular criticism of the concept of “cruel and inhuman treatment” as 
subjective and unrealistic”.
95 See Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Galdamez v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Informe N° 37/00, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 Doc. 3 rev. en 671 (1999).   
96 See Amnesty International in http://web.amnesty.org/pages/uj-index-eng “The United Kingdom 
has required that the Attorney General, a political official, approve a prosecution in England and Wales of a 
person suspected of torture.(23) The failure of the Attorney General to approve a prosecution of former Presi-
dent Augusto Pinochet during the year and a half that he was in England from 1998 to 2001 led to a percep-
tion that the failure to do so was based on political, not legal, considerations”.
97 The popular action gives legal action to a person without the necessity to allege personal interest or 
damage, but in defense of the legality.
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could be also considered as an important barrier for the development of 
the universal jurisdiction.
v. The preparation of national judges on this topic could be insuffi-
cient. This matter comes up when the House of Lords approached the Pi-
nochet case. As a result, the tribunal allows the procedural intervention, 
as amicus curiae, of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.98
vi. Other technical aspects could be present: lack of cooperation on 
foreign Sates, difficulties in the acquisition of evidence, existence of un-
justified delays in the detention of supposed criminals, absent of extradi-
tion agreements…
Both, in national and international initiatives, there are two circums-
tances that, in some cases, have frustrated the exercise of the universal 
jurisdiction: the prescription terms99 and the promulgation of amnesty 
norms. In relation with the first category, the Belgian jurisprudence has 
declared the imprescriptability of this kind of crimes.100 
Prescription does not seem to be a principle of international criminal 
law and appears to be irreconcilable with the character of the offences... 
Their imprescriptibility is inherent in their nature. Therefore, we find 
that, as a matter of customary international law, crimes against huma-
nity cannot prescribe and that this principle is directly applicable in the 
domestic legal order.
In relation with amnesty norms, the international community has 
developed a doctrine that marginalized their application. In this con-
text, the peace agreement promoted between the United Nations and 
the Sierra Leona government excluded, in its article IX, the possibility 
to give pardon when the crime was related to genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and serious violations of the International Huma-
nitarian law. At the same time, the jurisprudence of the Interamerican 
Court of Justice has declared de illegality of these norms in Argentina101 
and Chile. 
98 See Christine M. Chinkin. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 3. ( Jul., 1999), 
703 at 711. In Re Pinochet. United Kingdom House of Lords. Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary. Magis-
trate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3). [1999] 2 WLR 827. 
99 As a consequence of the principle of legality. 
100 See re Pinochet - Belgian Tribunal of First Instance Brussels, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 700, 703 (1999). In
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior530172001?OpenDocument 
101 See Ayala Corao, Carlos M. Las Consecuencias de la Jerarquía Constitucional de los Tratados relativos 
a Derechos Humanos. Ex Presidente de la Comisión Interamericana de Derecho. p.19. [Date of search: 
March, 2007] Available in: http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/Ayala-speech.pdf 
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The other impediment that limits the enforcement of universal ju-
risdiction lies in the application of doctrines related to the sovereign im-
munity.  One more time, comparative law finds contradictions in this 
field. On the one hand, in the Pinochet case the House of Lords, consi-
dered that in relation with the immunity of a head of State is necessary 
to make a distinction between official and non official acts, in addition, 
international customary law should be the source to determinate this cri-
terion.102 On the contrary, the International Court of Justice in the case 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium,103 has recognized the sove-
reign immunity of a Foreign Affairs Minister when it established... that 
the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they 
might have committed, irrespective of their gravity… While jurisdictional 
102 See Christine M. Chinkin. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 3. ( Jul., 1999), 
703 at 711. “The majority concluded that the immunity of a former head of state persists only with respect to 
acts performed in the exercise of the functions of head of state, that is official acts, whether at home or abroad.” 
The determination of an official act must be made in accordance with customary international law.2g The 
question was therefore whether “international crimes in the highest sense,” such as torture, can ever be deemed 
to be official acts of a head of state.30 This question required consideration of the parallel strands of the sub-
stance of international crimes and jurisdiction for their prosecution, and, in particular, the obligations in-
curred by the parties to the Torture Convention, “which lies at the heart of the present case.”… The majority of 
the Law Lords found that torture cannot constitute an official act of a head of state. Accordingly a former head 
of state cannot successfully claim immunity therefor, irrespective of any purported waiver by the state”.
103 See Case Concerning the Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Bel-
gium. International Court of Justice. 14 February 2002. General List No. 121. 60. The Court emphasizes, 
however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not 
mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of anycrimes they might have committed, irrespective of their grav-
ity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. 
While jurisdiccional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive 
law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it can-
not exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility. 61. Accordingly, the immunities 
enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a 
bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under 
international law in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries’ courts in accordance with 
the relevant rules of domestic law. Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the 
State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity. Thirdly, after a person ceases 
to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded 
by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one 
State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subse-
quent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private 
capacity. Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings 
before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, estab-
lished pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the 
future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter’s Statute expressly 
provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that “[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction over such a person.
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immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of 
substantive law. The Statute of Rome with regard to the operation of the 
International Criminal Court, in its article 27.2, disables this differentia-
tion, recognising the competence of the court for all cases104.
III.  The development of enforcement mechanisms by the  international 
institutions specialized in human rights
Since the creation of the Organization of the United Nations there 
has been adopted, approximately, ninety-three relevant documents rela-
ted with human rights.105 To these efforts, it should be add the important 
achievements reached in the sphere of the European Council, the Afri-
can Union and the Organization of American States. Unfortunately, the 
adoption of international instruments contrast with the lack of enforce-
ment mechanisms developed for the fulfilment of their resolutions. This 
situation is consequence of several causes: 
a.  From an universal point of view, only the Security Council of 
the United Nations has the power to adopt coactive measu-
res in cases of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression.106 In a regional sphere, only the Interamerican 
Court of Human Rights recognises the possibility to enforce, 
through an internal process, the compensatory elements of its 
sentences.107 Concerning this issue, a special case is represen-
ted by article 88 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.
104 Other international instruments with similar norms are; Article IV of the Convention for the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); Principle III of the Principles of Law Recognized 
in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950), Article 3 of the UN 
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954), Article III of the Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (“individuals . . . and representatives of a State”), 
Article 7 (2) of the 1993 Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Article 6 (2) of the 
1994 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Article 7 of the UN Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted in 1996, as well as in Article 27 of the Statute for 
the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998 by a vote of 120 in favor to only seven 
against, with 21 abstentions).
105 See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights web page in http://www.unhchr.ch/
spanish/html/intlinst_sp.htm  
106 See articles 39 at 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
107 See Article 68 of the American Convention of Human Rights.
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b.  In general terms, the obligatory character of the resolu- 
tions adopted by judicial international bodies is recognized.108 
However, if a State decides not to fulfil one judgment it will 
be merely under international responsibility.  Case law has de-
monstrated that this situation is not infrequent.109
c.  In some cases, as the observations made by the special commit-
tees established by the main international human rights con-
ventions adopted by the United Nations110 or the resolutions 
of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, is 
only recognized a recommendation value.111  The doctrine has 
not clarified if it could be possible to incur in international 
responsibility even if this acts are not obligatory to the states.112 
The fact that some of the precepts that are involved have the 
consideration of jus cogens, as well as the prestige of several of 
the already mentioned institutions, could construct theories 
that gives them this condition.
Because of these circumstances, the mechanisms used to implement 
international law have had an indirect character.113 For example, in the 
framework of the process 1235; the publicity of a debate can produce 
108 See Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as Article 59 of the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.
109 See Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1516 (2006). Implementation of 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. [Date of search: March, 2007]. Available 
in: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/ERES1516.htm “The 
Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has now adopted a more proactive approach and 
given priority to the examination of major structural problems concerning cases in which unacceptable delays 
of implementation have arisen, at this moment in five member states: Italy, the Russian Federation, Turkey, 
Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Special in situ visits were thus paid by the rapporteur to these states in order 
to examine with national decision makers the reasons for non-compliance and to stress the urgent need to find 
solutions to these problems. The issue of improving domestic mechanisms which can stimulate correct imple-
mentation of the Court’s judgments was given particular attention.6. In eight other members states – namely 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Moldova, Poland and Romania – reasons for non-compliance 
and possible solutions to outstanding problems have been considered, making use of written contacts with these 
countries’ delegations to the Assembly”.
110 See Article 5.1 of the optional protocol of the Covenant on Civil and Political and Article 22.5 of 
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel and Inhuman Treatments.
111 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in Article 120 of its Statute, recognizes 
the possibility to made observations concerning the communications received. This body enjoys of 
capacity of action before the African Court of Justice, having its resolutions a compulsive value. 
–see article 30 of its protocol-.
112 See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the In-
ternational Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001). Some articles deal with this subject: For 
instance, Article 12 and Article 13. 
113 Alston, Philip y Steiner, Henry J. International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Morals. 
United States: Oxford University Press, 2ª ed. 2000. 620 at 621.
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a feeling of shame in a State; an initiative can initiate bilateral or mul-
tilateral actions by other countries; it is possible to move a draft of re-
solution; the president of the Human Rights Commission can make an 
exhort. On the other hand, it is possible to provide assistance services; 
request more information from a State; approve a resolution criticizing 
the government and requesting the adoption of specific measures; ap- 
point a special reporter or group that could analyze the situation; request 
from the Secretary General the appointment of a special representative; 
request to the Security Council the adoption of sanctions and other pu-
nitive measures.  
This legal structure shows the existence of several tensions inside In-
ternational Law. A representative example is the pressures made, with the 
object to slow down the operation of the recently created International 
Criminal Court,114 through the negotiation of bilateral agreements un-
der the sphere of article 98 of the Rome Statute.115 
In this context, the main query tries to find out if the present system 
established for the protection of human rights is the most suitable or is 
merely the consequence of the evolution of the international relations, 
influenced by multitude of social, political and economic elements.  In 
114 See  USA for the International Criminal Court. U.S. and “article 98” agreements. How does this effort 
tie in with the larger US offensive against the Court?. [Date of search: mayo 2005] Available in: (http://
www.usaforicc.org/facts_art98.html On May 6, 2002, Marc Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, announced that the current administration no longer considered itself bound by the US sig-
nature of the Rome Statute and did not intend to ratify the treaty. In May 2002, the US first threatened to 
destabilize UN peacekeeping operations by promising to veto the UN mission in East Timor unless its military 
personnel were granted immunity from the ICC; the operation was renewed without such a provision. (The 
US has now succeeded in getting East Timor to sign a so-called “Article 98” agreement.) On 12 July, the US 
obtained a one-year renewal exemption in the context of the Security Council debate on the UN mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as indicated above. On 2 August, the last day before US Congressional summer recess, 
President Bush signed the American Servicemember’s Protection Act, which authorizes the withdrawal of US 
military assistance from certain non-NATO allies supporting the Court, but also includes broad Presidential 
waivers...US pressure on countries to support its so-called “Article 98” agreements intensified in mid-August 
2002 when US officials, including Pierre-Richard Prosper, US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, 
indicated that the US relationship with NATO would change should the US government fail to achieve its 
goal to secure broad non-extradition agreements. It has furthermore been reported that States seeking entry 
into NATO may be refused entry on the basis of a failure to sign a so-called “Article 98” agreement, although 
US officials are publicly denying this.   
115 See Council of the European Union. Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on the ICC. 
Brussels, 30 September 2002. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_the_Inter-
national_Criminal_Court United States and the International Criminal Court.  The U.S. claims that 
American soldiers and political leaders are at risk of “frivolous or politically motivated prosecutions” (a form 
of barratry). American troops and civilians are active in over 100 countries in the world and are therefore in 
a uniquely vulnerable position. Anti-Americanism is common throughout the world and is also reflected in 
other independent bodies within the United Nations system. There is no mechanism within the court for the 
United States to effectively control an independent prosecutor who pursued such an agenda.
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this sense, some recent researches associate the ratification of internatio-
nal instruments on this field with the different human rights practices.116 
In this line, authors as Oona Hathaway consider that International actors 
rewards ratifying states by reducing political pressure to promote human 
rights standards, thereby increasing human rights violations. Some factual 
data support this statement; on the one hand, the promulgation of the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights has been followed by the adoption of 
a multiplicity of treaties that repeat its content in specific fields. This 
profusion of norms has created an administrative magma that dilutes 
the efficiency of its effective realization.  On the other hand, the ope-
ration of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, in words of 
its Secretary General,117 has served to States have sought membership of 
the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves 
against criticism or to criticize others. Finally, the controls mechanisms 
that have given publicity to human rights violations occurred in some 
countries, have not avoid the development of dramatic situations as the 
one happened in Darfur.
The answer to this question probably could be find in the persistence 
of the same problems that International Human Rights Law confronted 
at the moment of the approval of the United Nations Charter, its rele-
gation to a secondary sphere in relation with the maintenance of inter-
national peace. That is to say, its international relevance whereas affects 
external circumstances of the States. Moreover, the development of me-
chanisms of action from the framework of the international cooperation 
has promoted the implementation of an assistant approach. This finan-
cial attitude avoids confronting, in several cases, the structural problems 
that human rights faces.
IV. Conclusions
The incorporation systems of International Human Rights Law in 
domestic jurisdictions are operating under the influence of the interests 
of the States. This situation has a direct impact on the uniform applica-
tion of its content.
116 See Goodman, Ryan and Jinks, Derek. Measuring the effects of human rights treaties. EJIL- The Eu-
ropean Journal of International Law. 2003, VOL 14 N.1 171-183. 
117 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Report. In larger freedom: towards development, security 
and human rights for all. United Nations General Assembly Fifty-ninth session Agenda items 45 and 55 
A/59/2005, 21 de March de 2005. p 45.
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First, the distinction between monist and dualist systems tends to be 
attenuated. On the one hand, systems traditionally regarded as dualist 
has evolved till be considered as monist -direct allegation-, remaining 
as a differentiator element the hierarchy position  -infralegal- of Inter-
national Human Rights Law in the domestic jurisdictions. On the other 
hand, most monist systems have turn into dualist systems in the sense 
that an international norm cannot contradict the content of a constitu-
tional disposition118. In this field, the use of the self-executing concept, 
by the monist systems, responds to dualist considerations, with the sin-
gularity to give more importance to the judiciary.
Second, the regional systems developed for the protection of human 
rights are promoting the use of monist incorporation mechanisms in the 
framework of their competences. Under these circumstances, there have 
not been established national hierarchy concepts in case that different 
international institutions maintain contradictory positions about one 
issue or deal with the incorporation of customary jus cogens norms.
Third, it is necessary to develop mechanisms that guarantee the 
judicial control on the incorporation process of international human 
rights law in domestic jurisdiction. With regard to the capacities of par-
liaments and governments, it should be created legal doctrines that res-
trict the power to denounce international treaties or resort to the indi-
rect method of promulgation of constitutional or legal amendments that 
achieve this objective.  
Fourth, the development of norms connected with the universal ju-
risdiction in national legal systems, requires more international coordi-
nation efforts that assure the observance of the principle of legal securi-
ty.
Finally, from an international perspective, the normative profusion 
developed in the sphere of International Human Rights Law during the 
last decades, is consequence of the lack of effective enforcement mecha-
nisms inserted in the international treaties. This circumstance favours 
that it has lost its natural character, diluting its effects in a tangle of ins-
titutions. For this reason, this body of norms are used, in several cases, as 
evidence of actions undertaken under the political, economic and social 
considerations of the international relations. 
118 Because is necessary to make a constitutional amendment it is not merely a problem of legal hier-
archy. 
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